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Abstract
This paper presents a random rotation perturbation ap-
proach for privacy preserving data classification. Con-
cretely, we identify the importance of classification-
specific information with respect to the loss of information
factor, and present a random rotation perturbation frame-
work for privacy preserving data classification. Our ap-
proach has two unique characteristics. First, we identify
that many classification models utilize the geometric prop-
erties of datasets, which can be preserved by geometric
rotation. We prove that the three types of classifiers will
deliver the same performance over the rotation perturbed
dataset as over the original dataset. Second, we propose
a multi-column privacy model to address the problems of
evaluating privacy quality for multidimensional perturba-
tion. With this metric, we develop a local optimal algo-
rithm to find the good rotation perturbation in terms of
privacy guarantee. We also analyze both naive estima-
tion and ICA-based reconstruction attacks with the pri-
vacy model. Our initial experiments show that the ran-
dom rotation approach can provide high privacy guaran-
tee while maintaining zero-loss of accuracy for the dis-
cussed classifiers.
1 Introduction
We are entering a highly connected information-
intensive era. This information age has enabled orga-
nizations to collect large amount of data continuously.
Many organizations wish to discover and study interesting
patterns and trends over the large collections of datasets
to improve their productivity and competitiveness. Pri-
vacy preserving data mining has become an important en-
abling technology for integrating data and mining inter-
esting patterns from private collections of databases. This
has resulted in a considerable amount of work on privacy
preserving data mining methods in recent years such as
[1, 3, 5, 2, 8, 9, 15, 18, 19], etc.
Data perturbation techniques are one of the most pop-
ular models for privacy preserving data mining [3, 1]. It
is especially convenient for applications where the data
owners need to export/publish the privacy-sensitive data.
A data perturbation procedure can be simply described as
follows. Before the data owner publishes the data, they
randomlychange the data in certain way to disguise the
sensitive information while preserving the particular data
property that is critical for building meaningful data min-
ing models. Several perturbation techniques have been
proposed recently, among which the most popular ones are
randomization approach [3] and condensation approach
[1]. In this paper, we will propose a new data perturbation
technique specifically for a class of popular data classifi-
cation mining models.
Loss of Privacy vs. Loss of Information.
Perturbation techniques are often evaluated with two basic
metrics, loss of privacy and loss of model-specific infor-
mation (resulting in loss of accuracy for data classifica-
tion). An ideal data perturbation algorithm aims at mini-
mizing both privacy loss and information loss. However,
the two metrics are not well-balanced in many existing
perturbation techniques [3, 2, 7, 1].
Loss of privacy can be intuitively described as the dif-
ficulty level in estimating the original values from the per-
turbed data. The more difficult the original values are es-
timated, the less loss of privacy is. In [3], the variance of
the added random noise is used as the level of difficulty
for estimating the original values. However, later research
[7, 2] reveals that variance is not an effective indicator for
random noise addition since the original data distribution
is known− if a particular data distribution is considered,
certain part of data in the distribution cannot be effectively
protected. In addition, [14] shows that the loss of privacy
is also subject to the special attacks that can reconstruct
the original data from the perturbed data.
Loss of information typically refers to the amount of
critical information preserved about the data sets after the
perturbation. However, different data mining tasks, such
as classification mining and association rule mining, typ-
ically utilize different set of information about the data
sets. Existing techniques do not explicitly address that
the critical information is actually task-specific. We ar-
gue that the information to be preserved after data per-
turbation should be highly specific to the mining tasks
and even to a particular model. For example, the task
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of building decision trees primarily concerns the column
distribution. Hence, the quality of preserving column dis-
tribution becomes the key in applying randomization ap-
proach [3] to decision tree model. In comparison, the
K-Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) model concerns primarily the
distance relationship, nothing to do with the column distri-
bution. We observed that, most classification models like
KNN typically concern the multi-dimensional informa-
tion rather than single column distribution. Thus, the per-
turbation is required to preserve multi-dimensional task-
specific information rather than single dimensional infor-
mation. To our knowledge, very few perturbation-based
privacy protection proposals so far have consideredmulti-
dimensional perturbation techniques.
Interesting to note is that the loss of privacy metric and
the loss of information metric have exhibited contradic-
tory rather than complimentary results in existing data per-
turbation techniques [3, 2, 7, 1]. Typically data perturba-
tion algorithms that aims at minimizing the loss of privacy
often have to bear with higher information loss. The in-
trinsic correlation between the loss of privacy and the loss
of information raises a number of important issues regard-
ing how to find a right balance between the two measures
and how to build a data perturbation algorithm that en-
sures desired privacy requirements and yet minimizes the
loss of information for the specific data mining task.
Contribution and Scope of the paper.
Bearing these issues in mind, we have developed a random
rotation perturbation approach to privacy preserving data
classification. In contrast to other existing privacy pre-
serving classification methods [1, 3, 9, 15], our random ro-
tation based perturbation exploits the task-specific multi-
dimensional information about the datasets to be classi-
fied, which is critical to a large category of classification
algorithms, and aims at producing a robust data perturba-
tion that exhibits a better balance between loss of privacy
and loss of information.
Concretely, we observe that the multi-dimensional
geometric properties of datasets are the critical “task-
specific information” for many classification algorithms.
By preserving multi-dimensional geometric properties of
the original dataset, classifiers trained over the perturbed
dataset presents the same quality as classifiers over the
original dataset. One intuitive way to preserve the multi-
dimensional geometric properties is to perturb the origi-
nal dataset through geometric rotation transformation. We
have identified and proved that kernel methods, SVM clas-
sifiers with the three popular kernels, and the hyperplane-
based classifiers, are the three categories of classifiers that
are “rotation-invariant”.
Another important challenge for the random rotation
perturbation approach is the privacy loss measurement
(the level of uncertainty) and privacy assurance (the re-
silience of the rotation transformation against unautho-
rized disclosure). Given that a random rotation based
perturbation is a multi-dimensional perturbation, the pri-
vacy guarantee of the multiple dimensions (attributes)
should be evaluated collectively to ensure the privacy of
all columns involved and the privacy of the multi-column
correlations. We design a unified privacy model to tackle
the problem of privacy evaluation for multi-dimensional
perturbation, which addresses three types of possible at-
tacks: direct estimation, approximate reconstruction, and
distribution-based inference attacks.
With the unified privacy metric, we present the privacy
assurance of the random rotation perturbation as an opti-
mization problem: given that all rotation transformations
result in zero-loss of accuracy for the discussed classifiers,
we want to pick one rotation matrix that provides higher
privacy guarantee and stronger resilience against the in-
ference attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that with
our attack resilient random rotation selection algorithm,
our random rotation perturbation can achieve much higher
privacy guarantee and more robust in countering inference
attacks than other existing perturbation techniques.
In a nutshell, random rotation perturbation refines the
definition of loss of privacy and loss of information for
multidimensional perturbation, and provides a particular
method for “conveniently raising the privacy guarantee
without loss of accuracy for the data classification task”.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the related work. In Section 3, we de-
scribe the properties of geometric rotation transformation
and prove that the three most popular categories of classi-
fiers are invariant to rotation. Properties of general linear
transformation are also briefly discussed. Section 4 intro-
duces a general-purpose privacy measurement model for
multi-column data perturbation and characterizes the pri-
vacy property of the rotation-based perturbation in terms
of this metric. Three types of inference attacks are ana-
lyzed under this privacy model. We present the experi-
mental results in Section 5 and conclude our work in sec-
tion 6.
2 Related Work
A considerable amount of work on privacy preserv-
ing data mining methods have been reported in recent
years [1, 3, 5, 2, 8, 19], etc. The most relevant work
about perturbation techniques includes the random noise
addition methods and the condensation-based perturba-
tion technique. We below focus our discussion on these
two sets of techniques and discuss their weakness in the
context of privacy preserving data classification.
Random Noise Addition Approach
The random noise addition approach can be briefly
described as follows. Suppose that the original values
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) from a column are randomly drawn from
a random variableX, which has some kind of distribu-
tion. The randomization process changes the original data
with Y = X + R, whereR is a zero mean random noise.
The resulting tuples(x1 + r1, x2 + r2, . . . , xn + rn) and
the distribution ofR are published. A reconstruction al-
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gorithm is developed in [3] to construct the distribution
of X based on the perturbed data and the distribution of
R. In particular, an expectation-maximization (EM) re-
construction algorithm was proposed in [2]. The distribu-
tion reconstructed by EM algorithm is proved to converge
to the maximum likelihood estimate of the original dis-
tribution. A new decision-tree algorithm for the random-
ization approach is developed in [3], in order to build the
decision tree from the perturbed data. Randomization ap-
proach is also used in privacy-preserving association-rule
mining [8].
While the randomization approach is intuitive, several
researchers have recently identified privacy breaches as
one of the major problems with the randomization ap-
proach. Kargupta et al. [14, 11] observed that the spec-
tral properties of the randomized data can be utilized to
separate noise from the private data. The filtering algo-
rithms based on random matrix theory are used to approx-
imately reconstruct the private data from the perturbed
data. The authors demonstrated that the randomization
approach preserves little privacy in many cases.
Furthermore, there has been research [1] addressing
other weaknesses associated with the value based ran-
domization approach. For example, most of existing
randomization and distribution reconstruction algorithms
only concern about preserving the distribution of sin-
gle columns. There has been surprisingly little attention
paid on preserving value distributions over multiple cor-
related dimensions. Second, value-based randomization
approach needs to develop new distribution-based clas-
sification algorithms. In contrast, our random rotation
perturbation approach does not require modify existing
data classification algorithms when applied to perturbed
datasets. This is a clear advantage over techniques such as
the method discussed in [3].
The randomization approach is also generalized by [7]
and [4]. [7] proposes a refined privacy metric for the gen-
eral randomization approach, and [4] develops a frame-
work based on the refined privacy metric to improve the
balance between the privacy and accuracy.
Condensation-based perturbation approachThe con-
densation approach [1] aims at preserving the covariance
matrix for multiple columns. Different from the random-
ization approach, it perturbs multiple columns as a whole
to generate entire “perturbed dataset”. The authors argue
that the perturbed dataset preserves the covariance matrix,
and thus, most existing data mining algorithms can be ap-
plied directly to the perturbed dataset without redevelop-
ing any new algorithms.
The condensation approach can be briefly described as
follows. It starts by partitioning the original data intok-
record groups. Each group is formed by two steps – ran-
domly select a record from the existing records as the cen-
ter of group, and then find the(k − 1) nearest neighbors
of the center as the other(k − 1) members. The selected
k records are removed from the original dataset before
forming the next group. Since each group has small lo-
cality, it is possible to regenerate a set ofk records to ap-
proximately preserve the distribution and covariance. The
record regeneration algorithm tries to preserve the eigen-
vectors and eigenvalues of each group. As a result, the
distribution and the covariance of the points in the group
are approximately preserved as shown in Figure 1. The
authors demonstrated that the condensation approach can
preserve data covariance well, and thus will not signifi-
cantly sacrifice the accuracy of classifiers if the classifiers
are trained with the perturbed data.
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Figure 1. Condensation approach
However, we have observed that the condensation ap-
proach is weak in protecting the private data. TheKNN -
based data groups result in some serious conflicts between
preserving covariance information and preserving privacy.
As the authors claim, the smaller the size of the locality in
each group, the better the quality of preserving the co-
variance with the regeneratedk records is. Note that the
regeneratedk records are confined in the small spatial lo-
cality as Figure 1 shows. We design an algorithm that tries
to find the nearest neighbor in the original data for each
regenerated record. The result (section 5) shows that the
difference between the regenerated records and the near-
est neighbor in original data are very small, and thus, the
original data records can be estimated from the perturbed
data with high confidence.
3 Rotation Transformation and Data Clas-
sification
In this section, we first identify the set of geometric
properties of the datasets, which are significant to most
classification algorithms. Then we describe the definition
of a rotation-based perturbation, and will discuss the effect
of geometric transformations to three categories of popu-
lar classification algorithms. In particular, we will discuss
therotation transformation. Before entering concrete dis-
cussion, we define the notations for datasets.
Training Dataset and Unclassified Dataset. Training
dataset is the part of data that has to be exported/published
in privacy-preserving data classification. A classifier
learns the classification model from the training data and
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then is applied to classify the unclassified data. Suppose
that X is a training dataset consisting ofN data rows
(records) andd columns (attributes). For the convenience
of mathematical manipulation, we useXd×N to notate the
dataset, i.e.,X = [x1 . . .xN ], wherexi is a data tuple,
representing a vector in the real spaceRd. Each data tu-
ple belongs to a predefined class, which is determined by
its class label attributeyi. The class labels can be nom-
inal (or continuous for regression). The class label at-
tribute of the data tuple is public, i.e., privacy-insensitive.
All other attributes containing private information needs
to be protected. Unclassified dataset could also be ex-
pored/published with privacy-protection if necessary.
3.1 Properties of Geometric Rotation
Let Rd×d represent the rotation matrix. Geometric ro-
tation of the dataX is generally notated as a function
g(X), g(X) = RX. Note that the transformation will not
change the class label of data tuples, i.e.,Rxi, the rotation
of data recordxi, still has the labelyi.
A rotation matrixRd×d is defined as a matrix hav-
ing the follows properties. LetRT represent the trans-
pose of the matrixR, rij represent the(i, j) element of
R, andI be the identity matrix. Both the rows and the
columns ofR areorthonormal[16], i.e., for any column
j,
∑d
i=1 r
2
ij = 1, and for any two columnsj and k,∑d
i=1 rijrik = 0. The similar property is held for rows.
The definition infers thatRT R = RRT = I. It also im-
plies that by changing the order of the rows or columns of
rotation matrix, the resulting matrix is still a rotation ma-
trix. A random rotation matrix can be efficiently generated
following the Haar distribution [17].
A key feature of rotation transformation is preserving
length. LetxT represent the transpose of vectorx, and
‖ x ‖= xT x represent the length of a vectorx. By the
definition of rotation matrix, we have‖ Rx ‖=‖ x ‖
Thus, rotation also preserves the Euclidean distance be-
tween any pair of pointsx andy, due to‖ R(x− y) ‖=‖
x− y ‖.
Similarly, the inner product is also invariant to rotation.
Let < x,y > = xT y represent the inner product ofx and
y. We have< Rx, Ry > = xT RT Ry =< x,y >.
Intuitively, rotation also preserves the geometric shapes
such as hyperplane and hyper curved surface in the multi-
dimensional space.
3.2 Rotation-invariant Classifiers
We first define the concept of “transformation-invariant
classifiers”, and then discuss the concrete classifiers hav-
ing certain property. We say a classification algorithm
is invariant to a transformation, if the classifier trained
using the transformed data has the similar accuracy as
that trained by the original data. We formally define a
transformation-invariant classifier as follows.
We can treat the classification problem as function ap-
proximation problem – the classifiers are the functions
learned from the training data [10]. Therefore, we can
use functions to represent the classifiers. Letf̂X repre-
sent a classifier̂f trained with datasetX and f̂X(Y ) be
the classification result on datasetY . Let T (X) be any
transformation function, which transforms the datasetX
to another datasetX ′. We useErr(f̂X(Y )) to notate the
error rate of classifier̂fX on testing dataY and letε be
some small real number,|ε| < 1.
Definition 1. A classifier f̂ is invariant to some
transformation T if and only if Err(f̂X(Y )) =
Err(f̂T (X)(T (Y ))) + ε for any training datasetX and
testing datasetY .
With the strict conditionf̂X(Y ) ≡ f̂T (X)(T (Y )), we
also have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In particular, if f̂X(Y ) ≡ f̂T (X)(T (Y )), for
any training datasetX and testing datasetY , the classi-
fier is invariant to the transformationT (X).
If a classifierf̂ is invariant torotation transformation,
we specifically name it as arotation-invariant classifier.
In the subsequent sections, we will prove that ker-
nel methods, SVM classifiers with certain kernels, and
hyperplane-based classifiers, are the three categories of
classifiers that are rotation-invariant. The proofs are based
on the strict condition given by Corollary 1.
KNN Classifiers and Kernel Methods
A KNN classifier determines the class label of a point by
looking at the labels of itsk nearest neighbors in the train-
ing dataset and classifies the point to the class that most of
its neighbors belong to. Since the distances between any
points are not changed after rotation, thek nearest neigh-
bors are not changed and thus the classification result is
not changed after rotation. Therefore, we have the first
conclusion about thek Nearest Neighbor (KNN) classi-
fiers.
Lemma 1. KNN classifiers are rotation-invariant.
KNN classifier is a special case of kernel methods. We
assert that any kernel methods will be invariant to rota-
tion too. Same as the KNN classifier, a traditional ker-
nel method is a local classification method, which classi-
fies the new data only based on the information from the
neighbors in the training data.
Theorem 1. Any kernel methods are invariant to rotation.
Proof. Let us formally define the kernel methods first. In
general, a kernel method also estimates the class label
of a pointx with the class labels of its neighbors. Let
Kλ(x,xi) represent the weighting function of any point
xi in x’s neighborhood, which is named askernel. Let
{x1,x2, . . . ,xn} be the points in the neighborhood ofx.
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A kernel classifier for continuous class labels1 i defined
as,
f̂X(x) =
∑n
i=1 Kλ(x,xi)yi∑n
i=1 Kλ(x,xi)
(1)
Let λ be the width that determines the geometric area of
the neighborhood atx [10]. The kernelKλ(x,xi) is de-
fined as,
Kλ(x,xi) = D(
‖ x− xi ‖
λ
) (2)
D(t) is a function, for example, D(t) =
1√
2π
exp{−t2/2}. Since‖ Rx − Rxi ‖=‖ x − xi ‖
and λ is constant,D(t) is not changed after rotation
and, thus,Kλ(Rx, Rxi) = Kλ(x,xi). Since the geo-
metric area around the point is not changed, the point
set in the neighborhood ofRx are still the rotation of
those in the neighborhood ofx, i.e. {x1,x2, . . . ,xn}
⇒ {Rx1, Rx2, . . . , Rxn} and thesen points are used in
f̂RX , which makesf̂RX(Rx) = f̂X(x).
Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers also utilize
kernel functions in training and classification. However,
it uses the information fromall points in the training set.
Let yi be the class label to a tuplexi in the training set,αi
andβ0 be the parameters determined by training. A SVM
classifier calculates the classification result ofx using the
following function.
f̂X(x) =
N∑
i=1
αiyiK(x,xi) + β0 (3)
Different from the kernel methods, which do not have
a training procedure, we shall prove that SVM classifiers
are invariant to rotation in two steps, 1) training with the
rotated data results in the same set of parametersαi and
β0; and 2) the classification function̂f is invariant to ro-
tation.
Theorem 2. SVM classifiers using polynomial, radial ba-
sis, and neural network kernels are invariant to rotation.
Proof. The training problem is an optimization problem,
which maximizes the Lagrangian (Wolfe) dual objective
function [10]
LD =
N∑
i=1
αi − 1/2
N∑
i,j=1
αiαjyiyjK(xi,xj)
subject to:
0 < αi < γ,
N∑
i=1
αiyi = 0
1It has different form for discrete class labels, but the proof will be
similar.
, whereγ is a parameter chosen by the user, a largerγ
corresponding to assigning a higher penalty to errors. We
see that the training result ofαi is determined by the form
of kernel functionK(xi,xj). Givenαi, β0 can be deter-
mined by solvingyif̂X(xi) = 1 for anyxi [10], which is
again determined by the kernel function. Therefore, it is
clear that ifK(Rx, Rxi) = K(x,xi) is held, the training
procedure results in the same set of parameters.
There are the three popular choices for kernels listed in
the SVM literature [6, 10].
d-th degree polynomial: K(x,x′) = (1+ < x,x′ >)d,
radial basis: K(x,x′) = exp(− ‖ x− x′ ‖ /c),
neural network: K(x,x′) = tanh(κ1 < x,x′ > +κ2)
Note that the three kernels only involve distance and inner
product calculation. As we discussed in section 3.1, the
two operations keep invariant to the rotation transforma-
tion. Apparently,K(Rx, Rx′) = K(x,x′) are held for
the three kernels. Therefore, training with the rotated data
will not change the parameters for the SVM classifiers us-
ing the three popular kernels.
Similarly, f̂X(x) = f̂RX(Rx) is held for the classifi-
cation function (3) for the same reason.
Perceptrons
Perceptron is the simplest neural network, which is a lin-
ear method for classification. We use perceptron as the
representative example for hyperplane-based linear clas-
sifiers. The result for perceptron classifier can be easily
generalized to all hyperplane-based linear classifiers.
A perceptron classifier uses a hyperplane to separate
the training data, with the weightswT = [w1, . . . , wd]
and biasβ0. The weights and bias parameters are deter-
mined by the training process. A trained classifier is rep-
resented as follows.
f̂X(x) = wT x + β0
Theorem 3. Perceptron classifiers are invariant to rota-
tion.
Proof. As Figure 2 shows, the hyperplane can be repre-
sented aswT (x− xt) = 0, wherew is the perpendicular
axis to the hyperplane, andxt represents the deviation of
the plane from the origin (i.e.,β0 = −wT xt). Intuitively,
rotation will make the classification hyperplane rotated as
well, which rotates the perpendicular axisw to Rw and
the deviationxt to Rxt. Let xr represent the data in the
rotated space. The rotated hyperplane is represented as
(Rw)T (xr − Rxt) = 0, and the classifier is transformed
to f̂RX(xr) = wT RT (xr − Rxt). Sincexr = Rx and
RT R = I, f̂RX(xr) = wT RT R(x− xt) = wT (x− xt)
= f̂X(x). The two classifiers are equivalent.
In general, since rotation will preserve distance, den-
sity, and geometric shapes, any classifiers that find the de-
cision boundary based on the geometric properties of the
dataset, will still find the rotated decision boundary.
5
w
xt
* * **
*
*
*
*
*
*
oo
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Hyperplane
Figure 2. Hyperplane and its parameters
4 Evaluating Privacy Quality for Random
Rotation Perturbation
The goals of rotation based data perturbation are
twofold: preserving the accuracy of classifiers, and pre-
serving the privacy of data. As we mentioned in the in-
troduction, the loss of privacy and the loss of information
(accuracy) are often considered as a pair of conflict fac-
tors for other existing data perturbation approaches. In
contrast, a distinct feature of our rotation based pertur-
bation approach is its clean separation of these two fac-
tors. The discussion about the rotation-invariant classifiers
has proven that the rotation transformation theoretically
guarantees zero-loss of accuracy for three popular types
of classifiers, which makes the random rotation perturba-
tion applicable to a large category of classification appli-
cations. We dedicate this section to discuss how good the
rotation perturbation approach is in terms of preserving
privacy.
The critical step to identify thegoodrotation perturba-
tion is to define a multi-column privacy measure for eval-
uating the privacy quality of any rotation perturbation to
a given dataset. With this privacy measure, we can em-
ploy some optimization methods to find the good rotation
perturbations for a given dataset.
4.1 Privacy Model for Multi-column Perturba-
tion
Unlike the existing value randomization methods,
where multiple columns are perturbed separately, the ran-
dom rotation perturbation needs to perturball columns to-
gether. The privacy quality of all columns is correlated
under one single transformation. Our approach to evalu-
ating the privacy quality of random rotation perturbation
consists of two steps: First, we define a general-purpose
privacy metric that is effective for any multi-dimensional
perturbation method. Then, the metric is applied to ana-
lyze the random rotation perturbation.
Since in practice different columns(attributes) may
have different privacy concern, we consider that the
general-purpose privacy metricΦ for entire dataset is
based oncolumn privacy metric. An abstract privacy
model is defined as follows. Letp be the column privacy
metric vectorp = (p1, p2, . . . , pd), and there areprivacy
weights associated to the columns, respectively, notated
asw = (w1, w2, . . . , wd). Φ = Φ(p,w) defines the pri-
vacy guarantee. Basically, the design of privacy model
should consider determining the three factorsp, w, and
functionΦ.
We will leave the concrete discussion about the design
of p in the next section, and define the other two factors
first. Since different columns may have different impor-
tance in terms of the level of privacy-sensitivity, the first
design idea is to take the column importance into consid-
eration. Letw denote the importance of columns in terms
of preserving privacy. Intuitively, the more important the
column is, the higher level of privacy guarantee will be
required for the perturbed data, corresponding to that col-
umn. Therefore, we let
∑d
i=1 wi = 1 and usepi/wi to
represent theweighted column privacy.
The second intuition is the concept ofminimum pri-
vacy guaranteeamong all columns. Concretely, when
we measure the privacy quality of a multi-column per-
turbation, we need to pay special attention to the col-
umn having the lowest weighted column privacy, because
such columns could become the breaking point of pri-
vacy. Hence, we design the first composition function
Φ1 = mindi=1{pi/wi} and call itminimum privacy guar-
antee. Similarly, theaverage privacy guaranteeof the
multi-column perturbationΦ2 = 1d
∑d
i=1 pi/wi is another
interesting measure.
With the definition of privacy guarantee, we can eval-
uate the privacy quality of a give perturbation, and most
importantly, we can use it to find the multi-dimensional
perturbation that optimizes the privacy guarantee. With
the rotation approach, we will demonstrate that it is con-
venient to adjust the perturbation method to considerably
increase the privacy guarantee without compromising the
accuracy of the classifiers.
4.2 Multi-column Privacy Analysis: A Unified
Privacy Metric
Intuitively, for data perturbation approach, the quality
of preserved privacy can be understood as the difficulty
level of estimating the original data from the perturbed
data. Basically, the attacks to the data perturbation tech-
niques can be summarized in three categories: (1)esti-
mating the original data directly from the perturbed data
[3, 2], without any other knowledge about the data (naive
inference); (2) approximately reconstructing the data from
the perturbed data and then estimating the original data
from the reconstructed data [14, 11] (approximation-based
inference); and (3) if the distributions of the original
columns are known, the values or the properties of the
values in the particular part of the distribution can be esti-
mated [2, 7] (distribution-based inference). A unified met-
ric should be applicable to all three types of inference at-
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tacks to determine the robustness of the perturbation tech-
nique. Due to the space limitation, we will not deal with
the issues about distribution-oriented attacks to random
rotation in this paper, and temporarily assume the column
distributions are unknown to the users.
Let the difference between the original column data
and the perturbed/reconstructed data be a random variable
D. Without any knowledge about the original data, the
mean and variance of the difference present the level of
difficulty for the estimation. Since the mean only presents
the average difference, which is not a robust measure for
protecting privacy, we choose to use the variance of the
difference (VoD) as the primary metric to determine the
level of difficulty in estimating the original data.
Let Y be a random variable, representing a column of
the dataset,Y′ be the perturbed/reconstructed result of
Y, andD be the difference betweenY and Y′. Thus
we haveD = Y′ − Y. Let E[D] andV ar(D) denote
the mean and the variance ofD respectively,y′ be a per-
turbed/reconstructed value inY′, σ be the standard de-
viation of D, andc denote some constant depending on
the distribution ofD and the confidence level. The cor-
responding original valuey in Y is located in the range
defined below:
[y′ − E[D]− cσ, y′ − E[D] + cσ]
The width of the estimation range,2cσ, presents the hard-
ness to guess the original value (or amount of preserved
privacy). In [3], Y′ is defined asY′ = Y + R, R rep-
resents a zero mean noise random variable. Therefore,
E[D] = 0 and the estimation solely depends on the dis-
tribution of the added random noiseR. For simplicity, we
useσ to represent the privacy level.
To evaluate the privacy quality of multi-dimensional
perturbation, we need to evaluate the privacy of all
perturbed columns together. Unfortunately, the single-
column privacy metric does not work across different
columns since it ignores the effect of value range and the
mean of the original data column. The same amount of
VoD is not equally effective for different value ranges.
One effective way to unify the different value ranges is
via normalization. With normalization, the unified pri-
vacy metric is calculated in following three steps:
1. Let si = 1/(max(Yi) − min(Yi)), ti =
min(Yi)/(max(Yi) − min(Yi)) denote the con-
stants that are determined by the value range of the
columnYi. The columnYi is scaled to range [0,
1], generatingYsi, with the transformationYsi =
si(Yi − ti). This allows all columns to be evaluated
on the same base, eliminating the effect of diverse
value ranges.
2. The normalized dataYsi is perturbed toY′si. LetD
′
i
=Y′si −Ysi. We useV ar(D′i), instead ofV ar(Di),
as the unified measure of privacy quality.
3. The unified column privacy metrics compose the pri-
vacy vectorp. The composition functionsΦ1 andΦ2
are applied to calculate the minimum privacy guaran-
tee and the average privacy guarantee, respectively.
This above evaluation should be applied to all of the
three kinds of attacks and the lowest one should be con-
sidered as the final privacy guarantee.
4.3 Multi-column Privacy Analysis for Random
Rotation Perturbation
With the variance metric over the normalized data, we
can formally analyze the privacy quality of random rota-
tion perturbation. LetX be the normalized dataset,X ′
be the rotation ofX, andId be thed-dimensional identity
matrix. Thus, VoD can be evaluated based on the differ-
ence matrixX ′ − X, and the VoD fori-th column is the
element (i,i) in the covariance matrix ofX ′−X, which is
represented as
Cov(X ′ −X)(i,i) = Cov(RX −X)(i,i)
= ((R− Id)Cov(X)(R− Id)T )(i,i) (4)
Let rij represent the element(i, j) in the matrixR, andcij
be the element(i, j) in the covariance matrix ofX. The
VoD for ith column is computed as follows.
Cov(X ′−X)(i,i) =
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
rijrikckj−2
d∑
j=1
rijcij +cii
(5)
When the random rotation matrix generated following
the Haar distribution, a considerable number of matrix
entries are approximately independent normal N(0, 1/d)
[13]. The full discussion about the numerical characteris-
tics of the random rotation matrix is out of the scope of
this paper. However, we can still get some observations
from equation (5):
1. the mean level ofV oDi is affected by the variance of
the original data column, i.e.,cii. Largecii tends to
give higher privacy level on average.
2. The variance ofV oDi affects the efficiency of
randomization. The larger theV ar(V oDi), the
more likely the randomly generated rotation matri-
ces can provide a high privacy level compared to the
mean level ofV oDi. Exact form ofV ar(V oDi)
should be complicated, but from the equation (5),
we can seeV ar(V oDi) might be tightly related to
the average of the squared covariance entries, i.e.
O(1/d2
∑d
i=1
∑d
j=1 cij).
3. V oDi only considers thei-th row vectors of rotation
matrix. Thus, it is possible to simply swap the rows
of R to locally improve the overall privacy guarantee.
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The third observation leads us to propose a row-
swapping based fast local optimization method for find-
ing a better rotation from a given rotation. This method
can significantly reduce the search space and thus pro-
vides better efficiency. Our experimental result shows
that, with the local optimization, the minimum privacy
level can be increased by about 10% or more. We formal-
ize the swapping-maximization method as follows: Con-
sider ad-dimensional dataset. Let{(1), (2), . . . , (d)} be
a permutation of the sequence{1, 2, . . . , d}. Let the im-
portance level of privacy preserving for the columns be
[w1, w2, . . . , wd]. The goal is to find the permutation of
rows that maximize the minimum or average privacy guar-
antee for a given rotation matrix.
argmax{(1),(2),...,(d)}{
min1≤i≤d{(
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
r(i)jr(i)kckj −
2
d∑
j=1
r(i)jcij + cii)/wi}} (6)
Since the matrixR′ generated by swapping the rows ofR
is still a rotation matrix (recall section 3.1), the above local
optimization step will not change the rotation-invariance
property of the givenclassifiers.
The unified privacy metric evaluates the privacy guar-
antee and the resilience against nave inference− the first
type of privacy attack. Considering the approximation-
based inference− the second level of privacy attack
through applying some reconstruction method to the ran-
dom rotation perturbation, we identify that Independent
Component Analysis (ICA) [12] could be applied to esti-
mate the structure of the normalized datasetX. We dedi-
cate the next section to analyze the ICA-based attacks and
show that our rotation-based perturbation is robust to this
type of inference attacks.
4.4 ICA-based Attack to Rotation Perturbation
Intuitively, one might think that the Independent Com-
ponent Analysis (ICA) could be considered as the most
commonly used method to breach the privacy protected
by the random rotation perturbation approach. However,
we argue that ICA is in general not effective in breaking
the rotation perturbation in practice.
ICA is a fundamental problem in signal process-
ing which is highly effective in several applications
such as blind source separation [12] of mixed electro-
encephalographic(EEG) signals, audio signals and the
analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) data. Let matrixX composed by the source sig-
nals, where each row vector is a signal. Suppose we can
observe the mixed signalsX ′, which is generated by lin-
ear transformationX ′ = AX. ICA model can be applied
to estimate the independent components (the row vectors)
of the original signalsX, from the mixed signalsX ′, if
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The source signals are independent, i.e., the row vec-
tors ofX are independent;
2. All the source signals must be non-Gaussian with
possible exception of one signal;
3. The number of observed signals, i.e. the number of
row vectors ofX ′, must be at least as large as the
independent source signals.
4. The transformation matrixA must be of full column
rank.
For rotation matrices, the 3rd and 4th conditions are
always satisfied. However, the first two conditions, espe-
cially the independency condition, although practical for
signal processing, seem not very common in data classi-
fication. In practice, the dependent source signals can be
approximately regarded as one signal in ICA and people
can often tolerate considerable errors in the applications of
audio/video signal reconstruction, cracking the privacy of
the original datasetX requires to exactly locate and pre-
cisely estimate the original row vectors. This has greatly
restricted the effectiveness of ICA model based attacks to
the rotation-based perturbation.
Concretely, there are two basic difficulties in applying
the above ICA-based attack to the rotation-based pertur-
bation. First of all, if there is significant dependency be-
tween any attributes, ICA fails to converge and results in
less row vectors than the original ones, which cannot be
used to effectively detect the private information. Second,
even ICA can be done perfectly, the order of the origi-
nal independent components cannot be preserved or de-
termined through ICA [12]. Formally, any permutation
matrix P and its inverseP−1 can be substituted in the
model to giveX ′ = AP−1PX. ICA could possibly give
the estimate for some permutated sourcePX. Thus, we
cannot identify the particular column assuming that the
original column distributions are unknown or perturbed.
The effectiveness of the ICA reconstruction method
can be evaluated with the unified metric as well. The
VoDs are now calculated based on the reconstructed data
and the original data. Since the ordering of the recon-
structed row vectors is not certain, we estimate the VoDs
with the best effort− considering all of thed! possi-
ble orderings and finding the most likely one. The most
likely ordering is defined as the one that gives the low-
est privacy guarantee among all of the orderings. Let
X̂k be the ICA reconstructed datâX reordered with one
of the row orderings, andpmink be the minimum privacy
guarantee forX̂k, k = 1 . . . d!, i.e., pmink = min1≤i≤d
{ 1Nwi (Cov(X̂k − X)(i,i)}. The ordering that gives low-
est minimum privacy quality is selected as the most likely
ordering.
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We observed that, when there is certain dependency be-
tween the attributes (columns), the ICA method cannot ef-
fectively lower the privacy guarantee. More importantly,
one can carefully select the rotation matrix such that the
chosen perturbation is more resilient to the ICA-based at-
tacks.
4.5 Selecting Rotation Center
Note that rotation does not perturb the points equally.
The points near the rotation center will change less than
those distant to the center. With the origin as the center,
the small values close to 0 keep small after rotation, which
is weak in protecting privacy. This can be remedied by
randomly “floating” the rotation center so that the weakly
perturbed points are not predictable. Concretely, the di-
mensional value of the center is uniformly drawn from the
range [0, 1], so that the center is randomly selected in the
normalized data space. The rotation transformation for
non-origin centers is done by first translating the dataset to
the center and then rotating the dataset. LetT be the trans-
lation matrix. The VoDs are not changed by translation
due to the factCov(R(X − T )−X) ≡ Cov(RX −X).
When the center-translated rotation is applied to the origi-
nal data, the center is simply scaled up (denormalized) by
the parametersi andti defined earlier. Since translation
preserves all of the basic geometric properties, the classi-
fiers seeking the geometric decision boundary will be still
invariant to translation.
4.6 Putting All Together: Randomized Algo-
rithm for Finding a Better Rotation
We have discussed the unified privacy metric for eval-
uating the quality of a random rotation perturbation with
the unified privacy metric. We have also shown how to
choose the rotation matrix in order to maximize the uni-
fied metric in terms of the naive value estimation attack
(naive inference) and reconstruction-based estimation at-
tack (approximation-based inference). In addition, we
choose to randomly optimize the rotation so that the at-
tacker cannot inference anything from the optimization al-
gorithm.
Algorithm 1 runs in a given number of iterations. Ini-
tially, the rotation center is randomly selected. In each
iteration, the algorithm randomly generates a rotation ma-
trix. Local maximization of variance through swapping
rows is then applied to find a better rotation matrix, which
is then tested by the ICA reconstruction. The rotation ma-
trix is accepted as the currently best perturbation if it pro-
vides higher minimum privacy guarantee than the previ-
ous perturbations.
5 Experimental Result
We design three sets of experiments. The first set is
used to show that the discussed classifiers are invariant
Algorithm 1 Finding a Better Rotation (Xd×N , w, m)
Input : Xd×N :the original dataset,w: weights of attributes in privacy
evaluation,m: the number of iterations.
Output : Rt: the selected rotation matrix,Tr : the rotation center,p:
privacy quality
calculate the covariance matrixC of X;
p = 0, and randomly generate the rotation centerTr ;
for Each iterationdo
randomly generate a rotation matrixR;
swapping the rows ofR to get R′, which maximizes
min1≤i≤d{ 1wi (Cov(R
′X −X)(i,i)};
p0 = the privacy quality ofR′, p1 = 0;
if p0 > p then
generateX̂ with ICA;
p1 = min{pmink , k = 1 . . . d!}, pmink = min1≤i≤d
{ 1
wi
(Cov(X̂k −X)(i,i)} ;
end if
if p < min(p0, p1) then
p = min(p0, p1), Rt = R′;
end if
end for
to rotations. The second set shows privacy quality of the
good rotation perturbation. Finally, we compare the pri-
vacy quality between the condensation approach and the
random rotation approach. All datasets used in the exper-
iments can be found in UCI machine learning database2.
5.1 Rotation-invariant Classifiers
In this experiment, we verify the invariance property
of several classifiers discussed in section 3.2. Three clas-
sifiers: KNN classifier, SVM classifier with RBF kernel,
and perceptron, are picked as the representative of the dis-
cussed three kinds of classifiers.
Each dataset is randomly rotated 10 times with differ-
ent rotation matrices. Each of the 10 resultant datasets
is used to train and cross-validate the classifiers. The re-
ported numbers are the average of the 10 testing results.
We calculate the difference of performance, i.e., accuracy,
between the classifier trained with the original data and
those trained with the rotated data.
In the table 1, ‘orig’ is the classifier accuracy to the
original datasets, ‘R’ denotes the result of the classi-
fiers trained with rotated data, and the numbers in ‘R’
columns are the performance difference between the clas-
sifiers trained with original and rotated data, for example,
“−1.0 ± 0.2” means that the classifiers trained with the
rotated data have the accuracy rate1.0% lower than the
original classifier on average, and the standard deviation
is 0.2%. We use single-perceptron classifiers in the ex-
periment. Therefore, the datasets having more than two
classes, such as “E.Coli”, “Iris” and “Wine” datasets, are
not evaluated for perceptron classifier. It shows that the
accuracy of the classifiers almost does not change when
rotation is applied.
2http://www.ics.uci.edu/∼mlearn/Machine-Learning.html
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Dataset N d k KNN SVM(RBF) Perceptron LOPmin LOPavg ICAmin ICAavg
orig R orig R orig R
Breast-w 699 10 2 97.6 −0.5± 0.3 97.2 0± 0 89.1 −4.9± 1.2 0.41 0.50 0.73 0.95
Credit-a 690 14 2 82.7 +0.2± 0.8 85.5 0± 0 64.6 +4.7± 1.5 0.31 0.47 0.51* 0.97*
Credit-g 1000 24 2 72.1 +1.2± 0.9 76.3 0± 0 70.1 −0.1± 0 0.40 0.51 0.52* 0.99*
Diabetes 768 8 2 73.3 +0.4± 0.5 77.3 0± 0 66.6 −4.5± 0.8 0.23 0.28 0.81 0.95
E.Coli 336 7 8 85.1 +0.2± 0.8 78.6 0± 0 - - 0.24 0.34 0.75* 0.95*
Heart 270 13 2 78.9 +2.1± 0.5 84.8 0± 0 67.4 −0.41± 1.0 0.42 0.54 0.50* 0.97*
Hepatitis 155 19 2 80.8 +1.8± 1.5 79.4 0± 0 79.4 −0.3± 0.8 0.37 0.48 0.53 1.00
Ionosphere 351 34 2 86.4 +0.5± 0.6 89.7 0± 0 66.9 −1.8± 0.6 0.31 0.41 0.82* 1.01*
Iris 150 4 3 94.6 +1.2± 0.4 96.7 0± 0 - - 0.43 0.50 0.69* 0.79*
Tic-tac-toe 958 9 2 99.0 −0.3± 0.4 98.3 0± 0 56.6 +8.0± 0.6 0.61 0.68 0.52 0.88
Votes 435 16 2 92.5 +0.4± 0.4 95.6 0± 0 60.3 −2.8± 1.3 0.65 0.82 0.50 0.99
Wine 178 13 3 98.3 −0.6± 0.5 98.9 0± 0 - - 0.26 0.34 0.78* 0.97*
Table 1. Experimental result on transformation-invariant classifiers
5.2 Privacy Quality of Random Rotation Pertur-
bation
We investigate the privacy property of the transfor-
mation approach with the multi-column privacy met-
ric introduced in section 4. Each column is con-
sidered equally important in privacy preserving, thus,
the weights are not included in evaluation. We use
FastICA package, which can be downloaded from
http://www.cis.hut.fi/projects/ica/fastica/, in evaluating
the effectiveness of ICA-based reconstruction.
Right side of Table 1 summarizes the evaluation of
privacy quality on the experimental datasets. The re-
sults are obtained in 50 iterations with Algorithm 1. The
numbers are
√
V oD = σ, i.e., standard deviation of the
difference between the normalized original data and the
perturbed/reconstructed data (LOPs/ICAs). The column
LOPmin represents the locally optimal minimum privacy
guarantee in the 50 iterations.LOPavg represents the lo-
cally optimal average privacy guarantee.ICAmin and
ICAavg represents the lowest minimum privacy and av-
erage privacy the ICA reconstruction can achieve in the
50 iterations, respectively. Among the 12 datasets, ICA
does not converge for 7 datasets which are marked by ‘*’
and thus not effectively reduce the privacy guarantee. For
the rest 5 datasets, ICA can possibly reduce the privacy
quality by some small amount, such as “Tic-tac-toe” and
“Votes”.
Figure 3 for dataset “Breast-Wisconsin” shows that
data estimated by ineffective ICA reconstruction. In this
case, the local optimized rotation perturbation is selected
as the best perturbation. Figure 4 shows that ICA re-
construction may undermine the privacy quality for some
datasets. In this case, the actual privacy guarantee will be
located at between the locally optimized privacy guaran-
tee and the ICA reconstruction lowered privacy guaran-
tee, for we can always select a rotation matrix that is more
resistent to ICA reconstruction. When it is detected that
ICA reconstruction can seriously reduce the privacy guar-
antee, say, to less than 0.2, we need additional methods
to perturb the data so that the conditions for effective ICA
reconstruction are not satisfied. We leave this as a part of
future work.
5.3 Rotation-based Approach vs. Condensation
Approach.
We design a simple algorithm to estimate the privacy
quality of condensation approach. As we mentioned, since
the perturbation part is done within the KNN neighbors, it
is highly possible that the perturbed data is in the KNN
neighbors of the original data too. For each record in the
perturbed dataset, we try to find the nearest neighbor in
the original data. By comparing the difference between
the perturbed data and its nearest neighbor in the original
data, we can approximately measure the privacy quality of
condensation approach.
Intuitively, the better locality the KNN perturbation is,
the better the condensation approach can preserve the in-
formation, but the worse the privacy quality is. Figure
5 and 6 show the relationship between the size of con-
densation group and the privacy quality on “E.Coli” and
“Diabetes” datasets. It was demonstrated in the paper [1]
that the accuracy of classifiers becomes stable with the in-
crease of the size of condensation group. However, we
observed that the privacy quality generally stays low, no
matter how the condensation size changes. Experiment on
both datasets shows the minimum privacy guarantees are
very low, neither are the average privacy levels. We also
observed that the minimum privacy is 0 for “Ionosphere”
data, which happens to contain one column that has the
same value. Condensation method seems not working for
such cases at all. Supported by the other two Figures (7
and 8), we can conclude that the condensation approach
only provides weak privacy protection and we cannot pos-
sibly adjust the perturbation to meet the higher privacy re-
quirement.
While the rotation approach provides almost zero-loss
of information for classification, it also presents much
higher privacy quality than the condensation approach.
Figure 7 and 8 shows the comparison on the minimum pri-
vacy guarantee and the average privacy guarantee of the
two approaches. The numbers for rotation approach are
the results generated by the randomized algorithm in 50
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iterations. For exmaple, in Figure 7, “Rotation-Min” de-
notes the optimal minimum privacy guarantee, taking the
ICA-attack into account as we discussed. We see that the
rotation approach can easily provide much higher privacy
level than the condensation approach.
6 Conclusion
We present a random rotation-based multidimensional
perturbation approach for privacy preserving data classifi-
cation. Geometric rotation can preserve the important ge-
ometric properties, thus most classifiers utilizing geomet-
ric class boundaries become invariant to the rotated data.
We proved analytically and experimentally that the three
popular types of classifiers (kernel methods, SVM clas-
sifiers with certain kernels, and hyperplane-based classi-
fiers) are all invariant to rotation perturbation.
Random rotation perturbation perturbs multiple
columns in one transformation, which introduces new
challenges in evaluating the privacy guarantee for multi-
dimensional perturbation. We design a unified privacy
metric based on value-range normalization and multi-
column privacy composition. With this unified privacy
metric we are able to find the local optimal rotation
perturbation in terms of privacy guarantee. The unified
privacy metric also enables us to identify and analyze the
resilience of the rotation perturbation approach against the
ICA-based data reconstruction attacks. Our experimental
result shows that the geometric rotation approach not
only preserves the accuracy of the rotation-invariant clas-
sifiers, but also provides much higher privacy guarantee,
compared to the existing multi-dimensional perturbation
techniques.
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